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INTRODUCTION
If there is one truth in every human interaction, it is that each involves the
human brain. This is equally true, of course, among interactions between
officers and individuals. Whether occurring as part of an officer's scrutiny of
data on a suspect's computer, or as an officer decides whether to initiate a
traffic stop, innumerable neural processing moments shape and direct
investigative and enforcement actions. Similarly, individuals who experience a
criminal event or are subject to law enforcement actions also constantly rely on
their cognitive systems to interpret and make decisions during these moments.
Thus, the brain operates both generally and specifically in ways that uniquely
affect the field of constitutional criminal procedure. For ubiquity alone, it is
* Associate Professor of Law, Seattle University School of Law and Faculty
Fellow, Korematsu Center for Law and Equality. The research for this article was supported
by a grant from Seattle University School of Law, and I hope to convey my deep
appreciation to the Deans of the institution for their generous commitment to this project.
Additional thanks are due to the organizers of the conference for which this article was
produced, and a special note of gratitude is offered to my colleagues on the conference
panel-your thoughtfulness and consideration inspired this writing. Above all, thanks go to
my Dear One, without whom nothing matters.
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therefore appropriate to analyze the infinite complexity of criminal
investigation and encounter through the ever-increasing field of neurology.
Neuroscientific studies continue to shed new light on intricate interactions
between the brain, its environment, and the mind that produce experience and
create subjective realities.I These interactions produce perception and
awareness, affect attention and memory, and underlie our decision-making
processes and judgment. Knowledge of these functions and patterns is
invaluable to understanding individual and group behavioral dynamics. Such
knowledge is also particularly crucial to criminal procedure, an area focusing
much of its own attention on the quality of perceptual data and decision-making
results that affect police and civilian action in deeply meaningful ways. Many
authors are now exploring the implications of brain science research for a
variety of legal areas. 2 As such, our appreciation of the role the brain plays in
social and legal interactions continues to expand.
Researchers are beginning to unpack the manner in which our brains are
influenced by race, culture, and the culture of race.3 Numerous studies have
detailed the subtle, yet significant, ways that race and racial identification affect
the information processing in which alert-that is, conscious-brains are
constantly engaged.4  Collectively, this research suggests that race affects
information processing in multiple phases, including information input during
1. See Susan B. Bandes, The Promise and Pitfalls of Neuroscience for Criminal
Law and Procedure, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 119, 119 (2010); Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda
Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations, 94 CALIF. L. REv. 945, 946 (2006);
Joelle A. Moreno, The Future of Neuroimaged Lie Detection and the Law, 42 AKRON L.
REv. 717, 722 (2009).
2. E.g., Bandes, supra note 1, at 119-20 (discussing how the last decade's
"explosion" of brain science information has impacted traditional bases of criminal
responsibility, including mens rea and mental competency); Greenwald & Krieger, supra
note 1 (discussing the implications that the "new science" of implicit bias and unconscious
mental processing have for discrimination law); Moreno, supra note 1 (predicting how new
studies in cognitive neuroscience will change criminal investigation, jury selection,
adjudication, and sentencing).
3. See, e.g., William A. Cunningham et al., Separable Neural Components in the
Processing of Black and White Faces, 15 PSYCHOL. SCI. 806 (2004) [hereinafter
Cunningham et al., Processing Faces]; William A. Cunningham et al., Implicit and Explicit
Ethnocentrism: Revisiting the Ideologies of Prejudice, 30 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL.
BULL. 1332 (2004) [hereinafter Cunningham et al., Ideologies of Prejudice]; Bernd
Wittenbrink et al., Evidence for Racial Prejudice at the Implicit Level and Its Relationship
with Questionnaire Measures, 72 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 262 (1997); see also
infra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
4. E.g., Allen J. Hart et al., Differential Response in the Human Amygdala to Racial
Outgroup vs Ingroup Face Stimuli, 11 NEuROREP. 2351, 2353-54 (2000); Sophie Trawalter
et al., Attending to Threat: Race-Based Patterns of Selective Attention, 44 J. EXPERIMENTAL
Soc. PSYCHOL. 1322, 1326 (2008); see also infra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
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perception, information storage during memory encoding, and information
processing during recall and decision-making.5 It takes little imagination to
predict the particular salience that these influences will have on the information
processing cycles6 that police and civilians go through during critical moments
of interaction. This immediate perceptual and behavioral impact is made more
complex by the subjective invisibility7 and actor independence of racial
effects, and is therefore largely beyond scrutiny and an individual's moment-
to-moment control.
Given the inherent role played by mind and brain, and considering the
strong influence that race imparts on both, it is worthwhile to ask what one can
learn about race and the brain in law enforcement encounters. The inquiry
could be focused in a number of useful ways but, at the very least, we might
begin to develop more nuanced ways of explaining some irrational patterns and
doctrines within criminal procedure. Whether evaluating the differential rate of
stop-and-frisk incidents between white and non-white individuals,9 seeking to
5. See infra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
6. An information processing cycle is a model used to describe how the human
brain interacts with its environment to turn stimulus into response. See Saul Mcleod,
Information Processing, SIMPLY PSYCHOL. (2008), http://www.simplypsychology.org/
information-processing.html. This model suggests the human brain processes information
analogously to computers. See id. In an information processing cycle, the observer goes
through four steps: (1) receiving input (or stimulus); (2) analyzing, coding, or evaluating the
input; (3) producing output (or response); and (4) generating new input, which in turn
triggers a new cycle. Id; see also Victor Kaptelinin, Activity Theory: Implications for
Human-Computer Interaction, in CONTEXT AND CONSCIOUSNEss 103, 105 fig.5.1 (Bonnie A.
Nardi ed., 1996).
7. That is to say, racial bias tends to affect an individual's perception and decision-
making processes in ways that are not apparent to that subject and defy her conscious
awareness. See Cunningham et al., Processing Faces, supra note 3, at 811-12; Cunningham
et al., Ideologies ofPrejudice, supra note 3, at 1344; Wittenbrink et al., supra note 3, at 273.
8. Researchers have found that the skewing effect that race can have on cognitive
dynamics affects Americans of different races roughly equally. See Hart et al., supra note 4.
It is important to note, in this regard, that while the effects observed were consistent across
races, all relevant studies discussed herein involved members of the United States' cultural
and political community. To the extent that race might affect brains raised in different
cultural, political, and racial climates in measurably different ways, such findings would
shine a bright light on the version of Americanism that tends to produce greater social
pathology around race, and could support important conversations about how to better
understand both our individual differences and also our essential collective sameness.
9. See, e.g., MARC KRUPANSKI ET AL., CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, RACIAL
DISPARITY IN NYPD STOPS-AND-FRISKS 7-10 (2009), available at http://ccrjustice.org/
files/ReportCCRNYPDStop_andFrisk_ .pdf (providing a full report and analysis on
stop-and-frisk data spanning from 2005 through 2008); Al Baker, New York Minorities More
Likely to Be Frisked, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2010, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2010/05/13/nyregion/13frisk.html (reporting that, in the 575,000 stops made by New
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explain high rates of incarceration' 0 and violent encounters with law
enforcement," or depicting patterns of over-policing in certain communities,12
we can and should ask, "What embedded influences might invisibly be at
work?"
In addition to suggesting possible pathways for explaining the results of
our law enforcement system, a robust understanding of the way in which race
operates on cognitive processes may help us evaluate the quality of our existing
responses to law enforcement misbehavior. To the extent that we currently
enforce constitutional procedural protections by use of analytical mechanisms
that do not account for demonstrable influences introduced by race, we may
consider either reforming or replacing those conventional approaches with
more-informed alternatives.
This article proceeds in three basic parts. Part I provides a brief survey of
research depicting a connection between race and neurological functioning.
While many features of this connection could be highlighted, Part I focuses on
the role of emotion, trust determinations, and bias awareness as particularly
salient aspects for purposes of police regulation. Part II turns to identify some
of the common perceptual and decision-making scenarios with which the law
of criminal procedure must deal. It is these situations where our neurological
conditioning can be most influential and our neuroscientific insights can be
most useful. Finally, Part III takes a brief look at the social and legal
implications of the findings presented herein. It seeks to situate a race-meets-
brain-science approach to thinking about criminal procedure within the larger
discourse of race as a cultural construct. The article concludes by suggesting
ways in which the law might be forced to conform to our new understandings.
York City Police officers in 2009, 490,000 of those stopped were black or Latino, while only
53,000 were identified as white-a rate nine times higher for people of color than for
whites).
10. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES: 2012, at 218 tbl.349 (2012), available at http://www.census.gov/
prod/2011pubs/12statab/law.pdf; see also MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW:
MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 225 (2010). In 2009, roughly
767,000 people were incarcerated in the United States. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra. Of
those people incarcerated, 424,500, or over fifty-five percent, were black or Latino. Id.
11. See KRUPANSKI ET AL., supra note 9, at 4. The Center for Constitutional Rights'
study found that, from 2005 to 2008, New York City police used force against whites in
seventeen percent of stops and against blacks and Latinos in twenty-four percent of stops. Id.
12. See Eric J. Miller, Role-Based Policing: Restraining Police Conduct "Outside
the Legitimate Investigative Sphere, " 94 CALIF. L. REv. 617, 625-34 (2006); Imani Perry,
Post-Intent Racism: A New Framework for an Old Problem, 19 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 113, 133
(2006).
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I. IMPLICATIONS OF THE RACE-CONSCIOUS BRAIN
Current neurological studies show that race, as one factor in a controlled
experiment, can have significant impacts on the functioning of the human
brain. Further, race often impacts the resulting experience and reality
constructed by the individual to whom it is exposed. This section provides a
brief overview of several studies that show connections between race and
human emotion, and between race and trust or credibility determinations. This
section also summarizes several recent reports indicating that racial awareness
or bias is generally implicit rather than explicit, that it impacts subjects of
different races roughly equally, and that it operates on an unconscious rather
than conscious level. These studies build on centuries of research and
speculation about brain development and architecture,13 and integrate the much
more recent explosion of findings that have come through the use of functional
neural imaging techniques, including the task-based electroencephalogram
("EEG") and the functional magnetic resonance image ("fMRI").14 Together
these techniques show that race impacts highly relevant brain activity in
significant, yet subtle, ways that essentially defy observation by the subject
whose brain activity is being measured.
A. Amygdala Activation, Memory, and the Race/Emotion Complex
The beginning of human information processing-what we think, what we
see, what we remember, and what we do-may be what we feel. Our emotions
appear to influence these matters at least as much as our reason does, insofar as
we have been able to associate particular regions of the brain with these
discrete aspects of our processing system.15 Every variety of brain function is
13. See MORTON HUNT, THE STORY OF PSYCHOLOGY 18-19 (updated & rev. ed. 2007)
(chronicling the rise of psychological studies, beginning as early as the fourth century B.C.E.
with Hippocrates' theories of the brain and its role in cognition).
14. See, e.g., ROBERT J. STERNBERG, COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 41-42, 47-48 (5th ed.
2009) (explaining the use of EEGs and fMRIs in cognitive research); see also FUNCTIONAL
NEUROIMAGING IN CLINICAL POPULATIONS (Frank G. Hillary & John DeLuca eds., 2007);
Monique Ernst & Sven C. Mueller, The Adolescent Brain: Insights from Functional
Neuroimaging Research, 68 DEVELOPMENTAL NEUROBIOLOGY 729 (2008); Grit Herzmann et
al., The Neural Correlates of Memory Encoding and Recognition for Own-Race and Other-
Race Faces, 49 NEUROPSYCHOLOGIA 3103 (2011) (using EEG technology to study the
influence of race on facial recognition).
15. See R.J. Dolan, Emotion, Cognition, and Behavior, 298 SCIENCE 1191, 1191
(2002) ("The importance of emotion to the variety of human experience is evident in that
what we notice and remember is not the mundane but events that evoke feelings of joy,
sorrow, pleasure, and pain. Emotion provides the principle currency in human relationships
as well as the motivational force for what is best and worst in human behavior.").
3232011/12]
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made up of millions of separate coordinated actions,16 most of which involve
multiple structures or regions of the brain.'7 And while every individual brain
has its own uniqueness, the human amygdala appears at the center of an
important list of networked functions that produce these cognitive conditions
and our behavior.' 9 One of those networking functions is the creation of our
emotional landscape and the modulation of our cognitive strategies in light of
our emotional responses to our environment.20 In playing that role, the
amygdala exerts certain influences on the other cognitive processes that occur
simultaneously.21
For example, emotion fundamentally affects memory. Starting with
perception and encoding, continuing with retention and consolidation, and
eventually culminating with retrieval or recall, emotion plays a central role in
memory and the amygdala is its pathway.22 Studies show that emotional
stimulation-that is, events that tend to trigger "instinctive" reactions such as
fear, anger, grief, joy, etc.-can enhance perception and allow us to focus on
the specific details of an experience.23 During experiments designed to
measure that stimulation, brain scans for study subjects reveal both that the
amygdala is activated by the emotional experience, and that the amygdala is
24interacting during these moments with the visual cortex. This interaction
produces an apparent enhancement of our perceptual acuity25 by sending
16. See Olaf Sporns, Network Analysis, Complexity, and Brain Function,
COMPLEXITY, Sept./Oct. 2002, at 56, 56-58.
17. Id. at 57.
18. See id. at 58-59.
19. See MICHAEL S. GAZZANIGA ET AL., COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 77-83 (3d ed.
2009). The amygdala is a group of neurons located within the larger, more primitive limbic
system that surrounds the brainstem. Id. This structure is a "profoundly important"
component in our system of emotional regulation and emotional memory. Bernard J. Baars,
The Brain, in COGNITION, BRAIN, AND CoNscIousNEss 121, 144 (Bernard J. Baars & Nicole
M. Gage eds., 2007); see also GAZZANIGA ET AL., supra, at 77-83, 368-85.
20. Benedetto De Martino et al., Frames, Biases, and Rational Decision-Making in
the Human Brain, 313 SCIENCE 684, 686 (2006).
21. See GAZZANIGA ET AL., supra note 19, at 77-83, 368-85.
22. Turhan Canli et al., Event-Related Activation in the Human Amygdala Associates
with Later Memory for Individual Emotional Experience, 20 J. NEUROscI. RC99, at 3-4
(2000).
23. Stephan B. Hamann et al., Amygdala Activity Related to Enhanced Memory for
Pleasant andAversive Stimuli, 2 NATURE NEUROSCI. 289, 289-90 (1999).
24. See Dolan, supra note 15; Elizabeth A. Phelps, Human Emotion and Memory:
Interaction of the Amygdala and Hippocampal Complex, 14 CURRENT OPINION
NEUROBIOLOGY 198, 199 (2004).
25. Perceptual acuity is a way of describing our ability to make sense of what we
see. See generally Wilson S. Geisler, Visual Perception and the Statistical Properties of
[Vol. 47:2324
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signals to that region of the cortex responsible for shifting our attention, and
decreasing the level of activity elsewhere.26 In essence, emotional triggering of
the amygdala increases our attention to certain immediate details, but does so
by inhibiting shifts of attention to other stimuli. This produces not a greater
overall awareness of the details of such an event, but rather a greater awareness
within a selective range of those event details.2 7
Similarly, emotion has been shown to affect memory retention and
consolidation in several ways. First, research shows that retention of
emotionally stimulating events actually remains the same for some time,
whereas "normal" memory begins to degrade immediately.28 This may be
explained by the fact that, during the retention phase following an emotional
experience, the amygdala is seen interacting in an extended "dialogue" of sorts
with the hippocampus.29 The hippocampus is a region of the brain also sharing
responsibility for memory, especially in connecting memory to emotion and the
senses.30 The amygdala appears to engage with the hippocampus function in a
way that improves the initial durability of that memory, but which requires
some time for the effect to manifest.3 1
Finally, when looking at the confluence of emotion and memory recall or
retrieval, studies show consistent particularized relationships. First, emotional
memories tend to be reported with a high level of resolution and confidence in
the recollection.32 However, studies also indicate that, just as with "normal"
memory, the accuracy of emotional memory ultimately decays and degrades
with time.33  Nevertheless, and in contrast to non-emotional memories,
subjective confidence in the detail and accuracy of an emotional memory stays
Natural Scenes, 59 ANN. REv. PSYCHOL. 167 (2008); Jan Theeuwes et al., Attentional
Capture Modulates Perceptual Sensitivity, 11 PSYCHONOMIC BULL. & REv. 551 (2004). In
this way, it functionally combines visual acuity (i.e., quality of observation) with cognitive
acuity (i.e., quality of understanding). See generally Geisler, supra; Theeuwes et al., supra.
26. See Dolan, supra note 15; Trawalter et al., supra note 4, at 1322, 1325-26.
27. See Ulrike Rimmele et al., Emotion Enhances the Subjective Feeling of
Remembering, Despite Lower Accuracy for Contextual Details, 11 EMoTioN 553, 560-61
(2011); Tali Sharot et al., How Emotion Enhances the Feeling of Remembering, 7 NATURE
NEUROSCL 1376, 1379 (2004) (noting that studies show "the subjective sense of
remembering emotional events can be heightened relative to that for neutral events, even
when the objective accuracy of these memories is the same").
28. Rimmele et al., supra note 27, at 553.
29. See id; see also Phelps, supra note 24, at 199-200.
30. Phelps, supra note 24, at 198.
31. Id. at 199.
32. Rimmele et al., supra note 27, at 553, 560.
33. Id. at 553.
2011/12] 325
HeinOnline  -- 47 Gonz. L. Rev. 325 2011-2012
GONZAGA LAW REVIEW
the same over time, contrary to the objective measures of both.34 Moreover,
while the parahippocampus (a region of the brain responsible for recognizing
places and faces) would normally be involved in processing and encoding the
contextual details of an experience,35 emotional memories involve a high
degree of amygdala activation and suppressed levels of parahippocampal
activation relative to non-emotional experiences.36 This enhances the influence
that the amygdala can have on memory recall because, unlike the
parahippocampus, the amygdala is more or less equally aroused by actual
memories as it is by reference to generally similar emotional events. 3 7
Ultimately, it appears that highly emotional events reduce awareness and
recollection of the event's contextual details, and that emotional memories
produce a high degree of confidence in recall without any corresponding
increase in accuracy. In addition, emotional experiences can enhance certain
aspects of memory, but such effects are highly selective, and people firmly
believe that they are not subject to these memory influences.39
These realities have important consequences when considering the role of
race in law enforcement interactions. Chief among the reasons for this may be
the fact that race, as perceived by the subject brain, produces high rates of
amygdala arousal,40 just as if that brain were dealing with an emotionally
charged experience.41 These effects are scalable, meaning that we are capable
of stronger and milder reactions to race just as we are capable of stronger or
milder reactions to an emotional event.42 However, the complex brain activity
depicted using available functional scanning technology shows exceedingly
34. William Hirst et al., Long-Term Memory for the Terrorist Attack of September
11: Flashbulb Memories, Event Memories, and the Factors that Influence Their Retention,
138 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: GEN. 161, 163 (2009).
35. Sharot et al., supra note 27, at 1376-80.
36. Id.
37. Phelps, supra note 24, at 200 (discussing fMRI studies suggesting that "having
an instructed, episodic representation of the emotional significance of a stimulus can lead to
activation of the amygdala, which in turn mediates the physiological expression of [emotions
such as] fear when this stimulus is encountered. These types of fears are imagined and
anticipated, but never actually experienced, yet they rely on similar neural mechanisms for
expression as those that are learned through direct experience.").
38. See supra notes 28-3 6 and accompanying text.
39. See supra notes 28-36 and accompanying text.
40. Hart et al., supra note 4, at 2351, 2353; Elizabeth A. Phelps et al., Performance
on Indirect Measures of Race Evaluation Predicts Amygdala Activation, 12 J. CoGNITIVE
NEUROSCI. 729, 732 (2000).
41. Hart et al., supra note 4, at 2351.
42. Phelps et al, supra note 40, at 730-32 (discussing test subjects' differential
responses to the faces of various races, and the correlation between the magnitude of the
difference and amygdala activation).
326 [Vol. 47:2
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similar patterns. Just as images of emotionally charged experiences trigger
amygdala activity, so do facial images of people from different races.4 3 Indeed,
studies show that amygdala activation correlates directly with other well-
established measures of implicit racial bias.4
B. Race and Trust
Perhaps because of the amygdala bridge, neuroscientific evidence also
demonstrates a relationship between brain activity, race (or social group
membership), and trust determinations. 4 5 Of the many decision-making centers
in the brain, the striatum is particularly involved in connecting our assessment
of outcomes to our selection of action,46 and the striatum interacts heavily with
the amygdala during this process.47 Again, remembering that race triggers
significant amygdala activity,4 8 and that the amygdala is a central part of our
primitive limbic system,4 9  it may come as no surprise that trust
determinations-being so essential to survival-would be subject to this
influence. It is also important to note, however, that amygdala activity can
reinforce implicit bias, and further, that implicit bias and trust determinations
are likewise directly correlated.so
43. Id at 731-32.
44. Id. at 730.
45. See Damian A. Stanley et al., Implicit Race Attitudes Predict Trustworthiness
Judgments and Economic Trust Decisions, 108 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. 7710, 7711-12
(2011); M. van 't Wout & A.G. Sanfey, Friend or Foe: The Effect of Implicit
Trustworthiness Judgments in Social Decision-Making, 108 COGNITION 796, 797-99, 801
(2008).
46. Bernard W. Balleine et al., The Role of the Dorsal Striatum in Reward and
Decision-Making, 27 J. NEUROSCI. 8161, 8163 (2007) ("Studies in humans corroborate the
research in animals suggesting that the dorsal striatum is an integral part of a circuit involved
in decision-making."); Mauricio R. Delgado, Reward-Related Responses in the Human
Striatum, 1104 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. Sci. 70, 72, 80-83 (2007).
47. Rudolf N. Cardinal et al., Emotion and Motivation: The Role of the Amygdala,
Ventral Striatum, and Prefrontal Cortex, 26 NEUROSCI. & BIOBEHAV. REvs. 321, 328, 329
fig.3 (2002); Nura W. Lingawi & Bernard W. Balleine, Amygdala Central Nucleus Interacts
with Dorsolateral Striatum to Regulate the Acquisition of Habits, 32 J. NEUROSCI. 1073
(2012).
48. Hart et al., supra note 4, at 2353; Jonathan B. Freeman et al., The Neural Origins
of Superficial and Individuated Judgments About Ingroup and Outgroup Members, 31 HuM.
BRAIN MAPPING 150, 156-58 (2010).
49. GAZZANIGA ET AL., supra note 19, at 77-83, 368-85.
50. See Stanley et al., supra note 45; van 't Wout & Sanfey, supra note 45, at 801-
02; see also Phelps, supra note 24, at 199-200; Phelps, et al., supra note 40.
2011/12] 327
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Rather obviously, we tend to distrust those against whom our implicit
biases run, and tend to trust those whom our biases favor. Accordingly, the end
result of these tendencies is the same: we are far more likely to trust those of
our own race, and less likely to trust those we perceive as racially different.5 1
This trust effect extends to simple credibility determinations (such as a
presumption of truth-telling), but also to the development of trust necessary to
overcome incentives against cooperative behavior. 52 For example, researchers
have shown that it is far more likely that an individual will risk his or her own
self-interest when collaborating with another running the same risk, in order to
achieve superior results for both.53 In contrast, where the bargaining partners
are of different races, studies show that the negotiating pairs regularly failed to
produce cooperative trust and that these negative trustworthiness
determinations strongly correlated with the individuals' implicit racial biases. 54
Indeed, what we see in the brain is reduced amygdala activation and
reduced striatum activation when interacting with same-race partners,55 and
increased activation in both centers when interacting with different race
partners. This indicates that racial feedback is relevant to informing our
assessments of future outcomes, and that emotional processing of racial input is
directly involved in those assessments. Importantly, studies continue to show
that black individuals are both more likely to be perceived as threatening, and
more difficult to perceive as non-threatening, than white individuals." When
subjects make decisions that heavily depend on amygdala and striatum inputs-
such as whether to "shoot" or "not shoot" a particular target-the outcomes
clearly correlate with the race of that target.58 This suggests that we implicitly
use race, along with a variety of other visual and cultural cues, to decide who is
trustworthy, of whom we should be suspicious, and whom we should fear.
51. See Stanley et al., supra note 45, at 7712-13.
52. See id.
53. See van 't Wout & Sanfey, supra note 45, at 797.
54. See Stanley at al., supra note 45, at 7710, 7712-14.
55. See Phelps et al., supra note 40, at 733.
56. See id.
57. E.g., Joshua Correll et al., Event-Related Potentials and the Decision to Shoot:
The Role of Threat Perception and Cognitive Control, 42 J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL.
120 (2006); Joshua Correll et al., The Police Officer's Dilemma: Using Ethnicity to
Disambiguate Potentially Threatening Individuals, 83 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL.
1314 (2002) [hereinafter Correll et al., The Police Officer's Dilemma].
58. Phelps et al., supra note 40, at 733.
328 [Vol. 47:2
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C. Race Bias, Reflection, and Non-Awareness
One final aspect of this ongoing research, which is exceedingly relevant to
the regulation of police officers acting in a racially diverse community, is that
the effects and influences detailed above are largely subjectively invisible. If
you could screen out all those individuals who harbor an explicit, conscious
bias against people of different races, you would still see a predominance of
racially skewed results in the remaining, subjectively unbiased members of the
pool. This is because race bias, at least as it can be suggested by or measured
in brain activity, is extremely elusive, being both implicit and unconscious.
Bias is often implicitly expressed, resulting in attitudes and opinions rather
than overt statements and actions of a racial nature. 59 The research indicates
that there is a significant divergence between explicit, self-reported race bias
and implicit, measurable race bias in the same individual study subjects.60 The
evidence strongly suggests that explicit bias is less prevalent, perhaps due to
social conditioning, than implicit measures would predict.6 ' Moreover,
researchers have shown that implicit bias-that is, uniformly "pro-White" and
"anti-Black" bias-is present early in childhood, and that the divergence
between explicit and implicit bias increases over time and is most pronounced
by adulthood.62
In addition to showing a mechanism for expression, these studies also
suggest that race bias often defies an individual's self-awareness. Even as the
brain scans of test subjects were creating a visual image suggesting the
influence of bias, many of those subjects were honestly and confidently
convinced of their race neutrality.64 This unconscious, implicit racial bias can
be driven by social coding and conditioning, as well as by personal moral
choice. The seeming impenetrability of the former, however, makes
responding to the attendant social harms particularly challenging.
59. See Anthony G. Greenwald & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition:
Attitudes, Self-Esteem, and Stereotypes, 102 PSYCHOL. REV. 4,4 (1995).
60. See id. at 15.
61. See id.
62. See Andrew Scott Baron & Mahzarin R. Banaji, The Development of Implicit
Attitudes: Evidence of Race Evaluations from Ages 6 and 10 and Adulthood, 17 PSYCHOL.
SCI. 53, 57 (2006).
63. See id. at 53, 56; see also Greenwald & Banaji, supra note 59, at 4, 6.
64. See Greenwald & Banaji, supra note 59, at 15.
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II. WHEN AND WHERE DOES THIS MATTER? PERCEPTION AND DECISION-
MAKING IN THE CONTEXT OF RACE
If neuroscientific research can provide us with a glimpse of the brain's
response to its immediate environment as it receives racial stimuli, what can
reason tell us about when and where these insights will be useful? Criminal
procedure is largely driven by the reconstruction and evaluation of perceptual
data or evidence,65 which itself often must be remembered and recalled prior to
becoming part of any investigative or judicial record. Further, such evidence is
frequently influenced by compounded levels of decision-making. Of the
many perceptual and decision-making moments that routinely occur in law
enforcement investigations and encounters, a significant number involve race.
The interconnected roles of race and emotion in our brain's information
processing and storage mechanisms present challenges in the following three
contexts: eyewitness identifications, suspect or offender threat assessments and
the use of force, and determinations of credibility or suspicion. Each of these
perceptual and related decision-making moments involves components of the
cognitive complex that show sensitivity to race. Moreover, these are moments
that we already seek to measure and regulate through criminal procedure.68
They therefore offer an opportunity to sample the Constitution's response to a
problem of inherent racial dimension and, subsequently, to consider possible
changes to the prevailing approach.
65. An evidentiary hearing on the admissibility of an eyewitness identification is a
perfect example of such a task. At that hearing, a judge's responsibility is to assess the
quality of a proffered witness's initial perception, memory, and recollection with respect to
the criminal event. See FED. R. EVID. 601, 701(a).
66. A probable cause determination made in evaluating the legality of a warrantless
automobile search is an example of this familiar task. In assessing whether the searching
officer had probable cause prior to inspecting the suspect automobile, a judge would have to
consider all the perceptual and memory evidence offered by the testifying officer, and
additionally would have to consider the quality of the inferential conclusions the officer
reached on the basis of those observations. See, e.g., Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690
696-97 (1996).
67. See generally Table 43a: Arrests by Race, 2010, FED. BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2010/crime-in-the-u.s.
-2010/tables/table-43/lOtbl43a.xls/ (last visited Dec. 23, 2011). The Federal Bureau of
Investigation estimated there were 10,177,907 arrests nationwide in 2010. Id. Of these
arrests, 2,846,862, or approximately twenty-eight percent, involved black suspects. Id.
68. For example, eyewitness identification testimony is subject to both Sixth
Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment review, see Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 79
(1970) (plurality opinion), while threat, use of force, and suspicion determinations all are
subject to various iterations of the Fourth Amendment's "reasonableness" analysis, see
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97 (1989).
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A. Eyewitness Identification
Eyewitness identifications are a problematic procedure familiar to both
federal and state courts.69 Although evidence indicates that eyewitness
identifications are fraught with both perceptual and structural error,70 they
continue to play an immensely important role in police investigations and
criminal prosecutions. For example, statistical and psychological data has
shown that eyewitness identifications, whether lineup ' or show-up
confrontations,2 produce highly unreliable evidence and frequently are
inaccurate.7 3 Notwithstanding those findings, jurors continue to place a high
degree of probative weight on eyewitness identifications, 74 and on average
show a poor understanding of the scientific research on the reliability of such
identifications.
Introducing race into this questionable environment may reinforce existing
sources of error or even exacerbate the likelihood of mistaken identification.
First, cross-racial identifications in general are demonstrably less reliable than
same-race identifications-that is, for people of all races, we tend to recognize
members of our racial group much more readily than members of other racial
76
groups. Second, multiple studies have shown that Americans of all races
69. See FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE CASE OF SACCO AND VANZETrI 30 (1927). Justice
Frankfurter's evaluation of the credibility of eyewitness testimony strongly influenced the
Warren Court in United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228, 234 (1967).
70. See Wade, 388 U.S. at 228 (describing eyewitness identification as "peculiarly
riddled with innumerable dangers and variable factors which might seriously, even crucially,
derogate from a fair trial," and concluding that these "vagaries" were "well-known"); 2
MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 103:1 (7th ed. 2012) ("Some
errors are so fundamental that they infect the entire trial process undermining its structural
integrity .... ).
71. A lineup identification procedure is one in which the suspect, along with several
other persons, are lined up next to one another and displayed to a witness for the purpose of
determining the suspect's possible involvement in criminal activity. See Gilbert v.
California, 388 U.S. 263, 269-70 (1967).
72. A show-up identification procedure is a one-on-one confrontation in which a
suspect is shown to an eyewitness for identification. See Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 195
(1972).
73. Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Eyewitness Memory for People and Events,
in 11 HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY 149, 149 (Alan M. Goldstein & Irving B. Weiner eds.,
2003).
74. See John P. Rutledge, They All Look Alike: The Inaccuracy of Cross-Racial
Identifications, 28 AM. J. CRIM. L. 207, 210 (2001).
75. See Richard S. Schmechel et al., Beyond the Ken? Testing Jurors' Understanding
ofEyewitness Reliability Evidence, 46 JURIMETRICs J. 177, 178 (2006).
76. Gillian Rhodes et al., Race Coding and the Other-Race Effect in Face
Recognition, 38 PERCEPTION 232, 232 (2009).
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make positive associations with white-identified faces and equally negative
associations with black-identified faces,7 thus revealing powerful implicit
expectations regarding character and race. Finally, and perhaps most subtly,
the presence of race as an element of an encounter can impair the entire
eyewitness account flowing from that event.78  Because eyewitness
identifications are the distillation of all three phases of memory-perception,
retention, and recall-those that involve race are potentially more problematic
than those that do not due to the heightened distortions of an emotionally
triggered amygdala. This means that eyewitness accounts in which race was a
perceived element have the potential to be less detailed and less accurate than a
similar account of a race-neutral event, yet told with even more confidence.79
While this is only one of many considerations influencing our evaluation of
eyewitness identifications, and while it might be a manageable consideration
when implemented as part of a nuanced approach to such evidence, eyewitness
testimony is currently evaluated using only the Sixth Amendment's Right to
Counselso or the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. 1 These tests
focus on specific formal guarantees and specific procedural safeguards in
individual cases, but have not been used to take a broader, more nuanced, look
at the nature and quality of eyewitness testimony in general. In other words,
the current procedural safeguards are too narrow to account for our increasing
understanding of how race can influence eyewitness identifications.
B. Threat Assessment and Use ofForce
Another perceptual moment that has significant consequences for law
enforcement encounters is the manner in which an officer assesses the threat
posed by a person with whom he or she is interacting.82 In order to preserve
77. See Baron & Banaji, supra note 62, at 53-56.
78. See discussion supra Part I.A.
79. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
80. See, e.g., United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 314 (1973) (concluding that the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel encompasses police lineups); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S.
682, 690 (1972) (explaining that police lineups are one of the "critical stages" where the
accused are allowed the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment); United States v.
Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 221-24 (1967) (prohibiting the admission of eyewitness identification
conducted without presence of counsel in order to prevent the introduction of unreliable
evidence).
81. See, e.g., Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 105-06 (1977) (relying on the Due
Process Clause to prevent the admission of eyewitness identification evidence that is so
unnecessarily suggestive as to raise the likelihood of mistaken identification); see also
Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 349 (1981).
82. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24 (1968) (recognizing that police must assess
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their own safety and complete the objectives of their profession, officers
frequently must predict whether an individual is "armed and presently
dangerous,"83 and do so on the basis of rapidly evolving, but limited
information." This predictive need can arise during a routine traffic stop as
easily as it can during an effort to overcome forcible resistance to formal arrest.
An officer's individual threat-assessment, moreover, has significant effects on
the officer's subsequent behavior.
Race has the capacity to influence these perceptions in meaningful ways.
If the essential calculus is whether an individual poses a threat of harm to the
officer, then the officer's perception of what and who is harmful becomes
centrally important. There are at least two ways in which race might skew this
perception, even in the well-trained, consciously unbiased officer. First, as
previously mentioned, studies have shown that Americans typically are much
more inclined to have negative associations with people of color, particularly
African American males.85 There is a persistent and irrational expectation and
perception of heightened propensity for violence and criminality in black
men, 86 and these expectations operate on the brain's information processing
mechanisms to instantly, but invisibly, color our judgment.87 The influence this
may have on stress-filled and split-second judgments-such as an officer's
perception of dangerousness and the decision to use force against an
individual-are unavoidably impacted by these cognitive processing patterns.88
Second, as set forth above, an individual's response to a person of different
racial background has a tendency to generate amygdala activity. The activity
of the amygdala affects the visual cortex by narrowing the focus of the officer,
especially as he or she perceives potential threat indicators, and defocuses
potential threats to protect themselves and others).
83. Id. ("[W]e cannot blind ourselves to the need for law enforcement officers to
protect themselves and other prospective victims of violence in situations where they may
lack probable cause for an arrest.").
84. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989) ("[Plolice officers are often
forced to make split-second judgments-in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and
rapidly evolving-about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.").
85. See, e.g., Baron & Banaji, supra note 62, at 53, 56; Cunningham et al.,
Processing Faces, supra note 3, at 806, 811-12; Trawalter et al., supra note 4, at 1322, 1326.
86. Sheri Lynn Johnson, Cross-Racial Identification Errors in Criminal Cases, 69
CORNELL L. REv. 934, 950 (1984).
87. See E. Ashby Plant et al., Selective Responses to Threat: The Roles of Race and
Gender in Decisions to Shoot, 37 PERSONALTY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1274, 1274-79
(2011); E. Ashby Plant & B. Michelle Peruche, The Consequences of Race for Police
Officers' Responses to Criminal Suspects, 16 PSYCHOL. SCL 180, 180-84 (2005).
88. Plant & Peruche, supra note 87, at 180.
89. See Phelps et al., supra note 40, at 732-34.
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attention to other contextual details that inform the threat assessment and
decision-making process.90 This generally heightens the emotional involve-
ment of the subject in the event,91 resulting in the increased role of negative
emotion in generating meaning and choosing responsive action.9 2 Of particular
relevance, the amygdala has been shown to be centrally involved in regulating
emotion, assessing trustworthiness, and managing fear9--three of the
dynamics essential to making threat and use of force determinations.
Law enforcement officers resort to the use of force in hundreds of
thousands of public encounters every year.94 Generally, the test for whether an
officer lawfully used force against an individual is whether the officer
reasonably believed such force was necessary to achieve a legitimate law
enforcement purpose. 95 Thus, prior to using force upon an individual, police
are compelled to make a very basic, but terribly difficult calculation: "Am I
being reasonable?" Reasonableness is an elusive concept, combining both
subjective and objective elements that are measured against the specifics of the
particular encounter.96 Nonetheless, it is a determination of which officers,
courts, and juries struggle. In reviewing an officer's decision to use force upon
an individual, the judge and/or jurors ask themselves: "How would I feel in
those circumstances? How should I feel in those circumstances?" To the
90. See Dolan, supra note 15, at 1192.
91. See id.
92. See id.
93. See Dominic T. Cheng et al., Human Amygdala Activity During the Expression
ofFear Responses, 120 BEHAV. NEUROSCI. 1187, 1187-93 (2006); Elizabeth A. Phelps et al.,
Activation ofthe Left Amygdala to a Cognitive Representation ofFear, 4 NATURE NEUROSCI.
437, 437-40 (2001); see also supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text.
94. Department of Justice research showed that just over forty million individual,
face-to-face encounters with the police occurred in 2008, with officers using or threatening
to use force in roughly 1.4% (or 560,000) of those encounters. CHRISTINE EITH & MATTHEW
R. DUROSE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SER. NO. NCJ 234599,
CONTACTS BETWEEN POLICE AND THE PUBLIC, 2008, at 2 & tbl.1 (2011), available at http://
www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpp08.pdf. These numbers were both down slightly from
previous studies in 2005 and 2002. Id. at 2 tbl.1 & 3.
95. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989); see also TOM MCEWEN,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS & NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SER. No.
NCJ-160113, NATIONAL DATA COLLECTION ON POLICE USE OF FORCE 5-6 (1996), available
at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ndcopuof.pdf.
96. See, e.g., Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (adopting the objective reasonableness test as
the standard for measuring an officer's use of force); Thomas v. Durastanti, 607 F.3d 655,
664 (10th Cir. 2010) (listing factors that are useful in determining whether an officer used
excessive force, all of which are to be assessed from the perspective of an officer on the
scene); Staats v. Brown, 991 P.2d 615, 625 (Wash. 2000) (stating that reasonableness is to be
determined in light of the officer's subjective perception at the moment, not in hindsight).
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extent this article has illustrated anything regarding explicit and implicit racial
bias mechanisms, one should expect the judge and the juror to be influenced by
the same cognitive forces that were at play in the mind of the officer. There is
little reason to expect a meaningful difference of impression or opinion in the
mind of the subsequent fact-finder.
Consequently, it is fundamentally important for law enforcement officers
to receive quality departmental training and continuous support in their
professional development. Officers need a clear set of guidelines and protocols
for measuring the necessity of the use of force in order to encourage rational
and dispassionate reflection prior to decision-making. Unfortunately, while
many officers credit their training with helping them make the right use of
force decisions,97 far too many officers report feeling undertrained and
unprepared to handle this crucial choice. 9 8
C. Credibility vs. Suspicion
A final instance illustrating the neurological implications of race on
criminal procedure exists in the context of credibility determinations. Law
enforcement officers must routinely assess whether a person with whom they
are dealing-suspect, witness, or otherwise-is communicating with them
honestly. Suspicion is honesty's opposite: the perception that the individual
with whom the officer is dealing possesses nefarious intent or is involved in
wrongdoing. The perception of that honesty is a culturally, biologically, and
rationally driven process, involving both the object and the subject in the final
calculus. 99 Within the realm of this inherent subjectivity, the race of the actors
can play a dominant effect.
The notion that individuals tend to trust those of their "own" race more
easilyloo and tend to trust people of other racial backgrounds less often,'o has
obvious implications for encounters between people of color and the law
enforcement complex. Race operates on the mind to create in-group and out-
of-group identification.10 2 These simple binary categorization strategies can
trigger implicit expectations about trustworthiness, cooperation, integrity, and
97. See, e.g., JEROME H. SKOLNICK & JAMES J. FYFE, ABOVE THE LAW: POLICE AND
THE EXCESSIVE USE OF FORCE 7 (1993); James J. Fyfe, Training to Reduce Police-Civilian
Violence, in POLICE VIOLENCE 165 (William A. Geller & Hans Toch eds., 1996).
98. See Skolnick & Fyfe, supra note 97.
99. See Luke J. Chang et al., Seeing Is Believing: Trustworthiness as a Dynamic
Belief 61 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 87, 87-88, 101-02 (2010).
100. Freeman et al., supra note 48, at 151.
101. Stanley et al., supra note 45, at 7712-13.
102. See Freeman et al., supra note 48, at 151-57.
2011/12] 335
HeinOnline  -- 47 Gonz. L. Rev. 335 2011-2012
GONZAGA LAW REVIEW
criminality that determine whether an encounter is perceived and managed
cordially or with hostility. Such expectations influence whether an individual's
explanation for his or her behavior is likely to be believed, and therefore
whether that individual may be subject to further investigation in an on-the-
street encounter. These expectations can even influence whether an individual
is initially perceived as a suspect, or instead as a victim, when officers first
come to the scene of a crime.103
Suspicion is especially relevant when considered in context of the Fourth
Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. The
constitutionality of a search or seizure may turn on whether a judge had
probable cause to issue a warrant,'0 whether a police officer had probable
cause to make a plain view seizure,tos or whether a police officer had
reasonable suspicion to perform a stop and frisk.'06 The justification for these
intrusions, however, is always the heart of the matter. Provided the awareness
that race unconsciously shapes individual credibility determinations, the
question becomes whether this should affect our review of officer suspicion
determinations.
III. THIS IS YOUR BRAIN ON RACE: WHAT TO Do WITH
WHAT WE FIND IN THE MIND?
Although race has certainly evolved, both as a construct and as a feature of
American life, it seems no less important today than it was at some of the
lowest moments in our racial history. Fortunately, overt racial discrimination
and hostility appear to be waning continuously.o 7 Still, implicit, unconscious,
103. See Johnson, supra note 86, at 934, 946, 949-51.
104. See, e.g., United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 105-07 (1965).
105. See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 323-25 (1987).
106. See, e.g., United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002); Illinois v. Wardlow,
528 U.S. 119, 123-24 (2000); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 499-500 (1983).
107. This trend has been noted generally, see, e.g., Gordon Hodson et al., The
Aversive Form of Racism, in 1 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION:
RACISM IN AMERICA 119, 130-31 (Jean Lau Chin ed., 2004); Russell K. Robinson,
Perceptual Segregation, 108 COLUM. L. REv. 1093, 1130-31 (2008). It has also been
recognized in the context of specific areas of law, including employment discrimination and
capital punishment. See David C. Baldus et al., Racial Discrimination and the Death Penalty
in the Post-Furman Era: An Empirical and Legal Overview, with Recent Findings from
Philadelphia, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1638, 1723 (1998) ("During the post-Furman period, the
level of overt racial animus appears to have declined throughout the nation. .. ."); Chad
Derum & Karen Engle, The Rise of the Personal Animosity Presumption in Title VII and the
Return to "No Cause" Employment, 81 TEx. L. REv. 1177, 1188 (2003) (discussing the "less
overt, unconscious, or more complex forms of [employment] discrimination ... emerging
after the law had begun to respond to overt forms of discrimination"); see also Phelps, supra
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and institutionalized racial bias is alive and wellios and permeating the criminal
justice system.10 9
A complete catalog of implicit bias is beyond the scope of this paper.
Nonetheless, myriad forces have been identified as part of the social coding
mechanism that produces race (un)consciousness:"l0 rampant deployment of
racial stereotypes in the media"' and entertainment industries,112 visible de
facto segregation creeping back into public schools," 3 the resurgence of race as
a genetic concept,"l 4 as well as drastic differences in employment," 5 health," 6
and perhaps even sporting outcomes.' 17 These highly visible racial disparities
reinforce the public perception that race is a "thing" that matters. No doubt,
note 40, at 729 ("Over the last several decades, research has shown that expressions of
prejudicial attitudes toward Black and White social groups, as measured by self-report, have
declined steadily." (citations omitted)).
108. Bill Ong Hing, Keynote Essay, Reason over Hysteria, 12 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L.
275, 285 (2011).
109. See generally ALEXANDER, supra note 10, at 224-26 (discussing institutionalized
racism).
110. See Charles R. Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317, 322-23 (1987) (discussing possible explanations
for unconscious racism).
111. See John Tehranian, The Last Minstrel Show? Racial Profiling, the War on
Terrorism and the Mass Media, 41 CONN. L. REv. 781, 798-801 (2009) (discussing media
depictions of ethnic and cultural minorities, especially those of Middle Eastern descent).
112. See, e.g., Leonard M. Baynes, White out: The Absence and Stereotyping of
People of Color by the Broadcast Networks in Prime Time Entertainment Programming, 45
ARIz. L. REv. 293, 293-95 (2003) (discussing media depictions of people of color and
suggesting that the media perpetuates stereotypes).
113. See generally Danielle R. Holley, Is Brown Dying? Exploring the Resegregation
Trend in Our Public Schools, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 1085 (2005); Girardeau A. Spann,
Disintegration, 46 U. LOUISVILLE L. REv. 565 (2008) (discussing modern racial integration
in schools).
114. See Jonathan Kahn, Race-ing Patents/Patenting Race: An Emerging Political
Geography ofintellectual Property in Biotechnology, 92 IOWA L. REv. 353, 359-60 (2007).
115. See Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking and Unconscious Discrimination,
56 ALA. L. REv. 741, 745 (2005); Jonathan C. Ziegert & Paul J. Hanges, Employment
Discrimination: The Role ofImplicit Attitudes, Motivation, and a Climate for Racial Bias, 90
J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 553, 553-54 (2005).
116. See, e.g., Alexander R. Green et al., Implicit Bias Among Physicians and Its
Prediction of Thrombolysis Decisions for Black and White Patients, 22 J. GEN. INTERNAL
MED. 1231, 1231-38 (2007); Michael S. Shin, Comment, Redressing Wounds: Finding a
Legal Framework to Remedy Racial Disparities in Medical Care, 90 CALIF. L. REv. 2047,
2051 (2002).
117. See Joseph Price & Justin Wolfers, Racial Discrimination Among NBA Referees,
125 Q.J. ECON. 1859, 1860-62 (2010).
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these forces are being actively and ably challenged, but certainly some time
remains before their patterns and structures can be entirely dismantled.
In the meantime, what can be done to offset harms emanating from racial
distortion of perception and decision-making? One matter that immediately
calls for reevaluation is our systemic reliance on deterrence as the exclusive
rationale or justification for the exclusionary rule in criminal prosecutions.' 18
By definition, and according to available science, the tendencies that might
skew awareness and choice are difficult, if not impossible, to deter. Restricting
the exclusionary rule to only those situations where the underlying behavior
can be substantially deterred in the future tends to categorically insulate those
behaviors over which an officer has little effective control. This also limits the
extent to which developing that control will be seen as a legitimate objective in
officer training and education.
Another matter on which debate continues is the ongoing effort to increase
racial diversity in American police departments." 9 Such efforts should extend
both to rank and file officers and department leadership-but especially those
departments serving racially diverse communities. This is an admirable and
well-chosen goal, the success of which could produce many beneficial effects.
Unfortunately, it remains merely a goal 20 and arguably incapable of solving
problems of race consciousness because both white and non-white study
subjects tend to show the same inclination in implicit bias test studies.12 1 It
may prove to be the case that adding more African American and Latino
officers, who are likewise socially programmed, changes little, if anything.
Some optimism for offsetting racial bias can be found in studies of implicit
bias and the neural pathways for its operation and expression. In particular,
scientists have observed evidence that training can diminish the strength of the
118. See Sharon L. Davies & Anna B. Scanlon, Katz in the Age of Hudson v.
Michigan: Some Thoughts on "Suppression as a Last Resort," 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1035,
1041-42 (2008) (providing a helpful and duly critical review of the evolution of the
exclusionary rule, from its remedial roots to its modem deterrence rationale).
119. For a helpful overview of the landscape of that debate, see David Alan Sklansky,
Not Your Father's Police Department: Making Sense of the New Demographics of Law
Enforcement, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1209 (2006).
120. See JACK MCDEvITT ET AL., INST. ON RACE & JUSTICE, NE. UNIv., COPS
EVALUATION BRIEF No. 1, PROMOTING COOPERATIVE STRATEGIES TO REDUCE RACIAL
PROFILING 14-15 (2008), available at http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/files/RIC/Publications/
e08086157.pdf.
121. See, e.g., Correll et al., The Police Officer's Dilemma, supra note 57; Cheryl L.
Dicker & Bruce D. Bartholow, Racial Ingroup and Outgroup Attention Biases Revealed by
Event-Related Brain Potentials, 2 Soc. COGNITIVE & AFFECTIVE NEUROSCI. 189, 196-97
(2007); Ottmar V. Lipp et al., Electro-Cortical Implicit Race Bias Does Not Vary with
Participants' Race or Sex, 6 Soc. COGNITIVE & AFFECTIVE NEUROSCI. 591, 599-600 (2011);
Stanley et al., supra note 45, at 7713-14.
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bias in measurable amounts. 122 Such training has been shown to be effective in
improving cross-racial recognition' 23-one of the most powerful sources of
errors in eyewitness identifications.124 Perhaps most promisingly, researchers
have noted that improvements in out-of-group identification ability 2 5 correlates
with or even produces reduced bias on subsequent implicit association tests. 126
This may suggest that the ability to recognize a person of another race, as an
individual and identifiable person, can reduce the social bias we may have for
them.
CONCLUSION
These findings indicate that race sensitivity may be something that is both
learned and susceptible of being unlearned. This unlearning can be
accomplished by new and veteran officers who already routinely receive
ongoing professional training.127 Such unlearning, and the need for it, can be
validated by judicial officers, who might also receive enhanced initial and
ongoing training regarding the neuroscience of race bias, perception, and
decision-making. The justice system might even go so far as to educate juries,
122. Rankin W. McGugin et al., Race-Specific Perceptual Discrimination
Improvement Following Short Individuation Training with Faces, 35 COGNTTIvE Sci. 330,
343 (2011).
123. Id.
124. Radha Natarajan, Racialized Memory and Reliability: Due Process Applied to
Cross-Racial Eyewitness Identfications, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1821, 1822-23 (2003); Rutledge,
supra note 74, at 207. The last thing we can do is go on with business as usual in the
continued uncritical approach to eyewitness identifications. The time has long since passed
for the U.S. Supreme Court to take a new and exacting look at the basic integrity and
reliability of this type of evidence, and that day appears to finally be on the horizon. See
Perry v. New Hampshire, 131 S. Ct. 2932 (2011) (mem.), certifying questions to State v.
Perry, No. 2009-0590 (N.H. Nov. 18, 2010).
125. Sophie Lebrecht et al., Perceptual Other-Race Training Reduces Implicit Racial
Bias, PLOS ONE, Jan. 21, 2009, at e4215, at 1, 3, http://www.plosone.org/article/fetchObject
Attachment.action?uri=info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjoumal.pone.00042 15&representation=
PDF (stating that, while "people perceive[] other-race faces as more similar than own-race
faces," greater experience over the course of a lifetime "leads to greater expertise in
individuating faces").
126. Id.
127. For example, the Miami Police Department's Training and Personnel
Development Section administered at least fifty individual training courses and produced at
least 743 graduates in 2010. See Training & Personnel Development, MIAMI POLICE DEP'T,
http://www.miami-police.org/training.html (last visited Dec. 24, 2011). Similarly, California
requires its officers to complete at least twenty-four hours of training every two years. See
Refresher Training, CAL. COMM'N ON PEACE OFFICER STANDARDS & TRAINING, http://www.
post.ca.gov/refresher-training.aspx (last visited Dec. 24, 2011).
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in appropriate cases, regarding the role that race can play in shaping and
misshaping the evidence presented to them. Particularly where there is little or
no other evidence of guilt,12 8 the perceptions and conclusions of an honest, but
race-sensitive, brain should be viewed by the jury with more skepticism than
the current standard practices advise. Instead of leaving this matter to the
discretion of trial judges,' 2 9 making the science behind race and perception
more generally and uniformly part of juror education could incrementally
increase public awareness regarding the implicit racial bias perpetuated by our
laws and culture.
128. See Schmechel et al., supra note 75, at 189-90.
129. Id. at 185-87.
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